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ARBITRATING IN THE ETHER OF INTENT
JARROD WONG*
ABSTRACT
 The U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 
is incoherent in a respect that is fundamental yet not quite captured in existing legal litera-
ture. Specifically, in determining the core question of whether any particular dispute should 
be resolved by arbitration under the FAA, the Court has stubbornly relied on the concept of 
the parties’ “intent” on the matter. “Intent,” however, is at once elusive and polymorphic. It is 
elusive because the parties will often not have considered whether the particular issue is 
arbitrable, much less who—court or arbitrator—should decide that preliminary question. It 
is polymorphic as rendered by the Court, which has veered from looking for evidence of ac-
tual, conscious intent to constructive intent, and also from seeking out the intent to be bound 
procedurally by arbitration to the intent respecting the substantive terms of the arbitration 
agreement. These different senses of intent can and do conflict, but the careful differentia-
tion thereof is masked by the Court’s treatment of “intent” as a monolithic concept. 
 To illustrate the distorting influence on FAA jurisprudence, this Article dissects Su-
preme Court opinions in two broad sections of the FAA case law, both of which illustrate 
vividly the deforming effect of intent on it. The first concerns the carving up of jurisdiction 
between courts and arbitrators that goes to the foundations of the FAA, namely, the question 
of which decisionmaker—court or arbitrator—should determine whether the underlying 
dispute is arbitrable. The second is a controversy of more recent provenance that already has 
striking implications for all manner of consumer and employment contracts, specifically, the 
question concerning the availability of class arbitration. The result of this confused exercise 
is a tottering FAA case law built on ever more rarefied abstractions of “intent” that are little 
anchored in reality, yet impact in a very real way a broad range of contracts, including 
countless consumer and employment agreements. Thus, a complete and accurate account of 
the Court’s jurisprudence under the FAA is not possible without a close scrutiny of the role 
of “intent,” a concept that is ultimately wanting. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Sometimes the reader will decide something else than the author’s 
intent; this is certainly true of attempts to empirically decipher reality.” 
       John M. Ford1 
 Consider the curious state of affairs under the Federal Arbitration 
Act from this particularized perspective: As things stand before the 
U.S. Supreme Court, when one compares the cases of Green Tree Fi-
nancial Corp. v. Bazzle and Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Inter-
national Corp., parties who want an arbitrator to decide whether 
class arbitration is available apparently do better to say nothing of 
the matter than to provide expressly for it in their agreement. 
 In Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, the individual arbitration 
agreements between the bank and its customers were silent on 
whether the customers could proceed with class arbitration as op-
posed to bilateral arbitration. The Court determined that the arbitra-
tor (rather than the court) should decide that question because its 
procedural nature made it more likely that the parties “intended” the 
arbitrator to resolve it.2 Contrast Bazzle with Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds International Corp., which similarly involved an arbi-
tration agreement between the parties that was silent on whether 
the claimant could pursue class arbitration rather than bilateral ar-
bitration.3 To resolve this issue, the parties entered into a supple-
mental agreement providing explicitly that the question of class arbi-
tration be submitted to a panel of three arbitrators, which deter-
mined that class arbitration was in fact available.4 The Court, how-
ever, subsequently vacated the panel’s award, opining instead that 
the parties must have meant to preclude class arbitration.5 Notwith-
standing the supplemental agreement, and even though it acknowl-
edged that the matter was a question for the arbitrators, the Court 
overrode the arbitrators’ decision, and took it upon itself to interpret 
affirmatively the arbitration agreement as prohibiting class arbitra-
tion.6 Thus, parties who are intent on an arbitrator deciding the 
                                                                                                                  
 1. Interview by Mary Anne Mohanraj and Fred Bush with John M. Ford, noted science 
fiction author (Apr. 29, 2002), http://www.strangehorizons.com/2002/20020429/interview.shtml. 
 2. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452 (2003) (plurality opinion); see 
infra Part II.B.i. 
 3. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1766 (2010). 
 4. Id. at 1765-66. 
 5. Id. at 1775-77. 
 6. Id. at 1770, 1776. 
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availability of class arbitration should apparently do anything but 
expressly designate the arbitrator for the job in their agreement.7 We 
are accordingly left with the paradox that silence best demonstrates 
the parties’ intent on the matter. 
 Like Bazzle, many of the Court’s FAA decisions pivot on the par-
ties’ “intent,” notwithstanding the arbitration agreement’s silence on 
the matter. In turn, underlying the Court’s persistence in setting its 
compass by the parties’ intent is its near-religious conviction that 
arbitration is no more or less than “a matter of contract.”8 However, 
far from a lodestar, the parties’ intent is often difficult to locate; in-
deed, the very term itself evades precise definition.9 As explored in 
detail below, so malleable is “intent” that it runs the significant risk 
of serving merely as a vehicle for the Court’s own opinion, as has ar-
guably happened in Stolt-Nielsen.10 At the same time, so sacred is “in-
tent” that, having apparently divined it, the Court appears prepared to 
safeguard it, even at great cost to the FAA’s integrity, as has debatably 
occurred in the recent case of Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson.11
 This Article examines these and other Supreme Court opinions on 
the FAA to illustrate the significant and often distorting influence of 
the concept of “intent” at the core of that case law. While there is 
ready consensus that the relevant FAA jurisprudence is at times in-
coherent,12 one is hard pressed to find sustained efforts to explain 
                                                                                                                  
 7. I do not maintain that this proposition is universally true. The purpose of this 
select and focused comparison between Bazzle and Stolt-Nielsen is simply to demonstrate 
that the Court’s misplaced reliance on the concept of intent can lead to perverse results. 
 8. First Options of Chicago Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995). 
9. See generally Gregory Klass, Intent to Contract, 95 VA. L. REV. 1437 (2009); Jody 
S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of Contractual Intent, 84 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023 (2009). See also Lawrence M. Solan, Contract as Agreement, 83 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 353, 394 (2007) (“[D]efinitions contained in the Restatement tend to be de-
void of intent, focusing instead on ‘manifestations of intent’ . . . .”). 
 10. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1770, 1775-77 (vacating the arbitrators’ award inter-
preting the particular arbitration clause as allowing for class arbitration and affirmatively 
interpreting the clause to mean otherwise, in place of remanding the question back to the 
arbitrators); see infra Part II.B.ii. 
 11. Rent-A-Ctr, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010) (referring the question of 
whether the employment dispute is arbitrable to the arbitrator—rather than the court—on 
account of a delegation-to-the-arbitrator clause drafted by the employer that the Court 
found was immune to the employee’s challenge that the broader stand-alone arbitration 
agreement containing the delegation clause was unconscionable because the challenge 
targeted the arbitration agreement as a whole, rather than the delegation clause itself). 
See infra Part III.C. 
 12. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, The Appropriate Role of State Law in the Federal Arbi-
tration System: Choice and Preemption, in ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL
ASSESSMENT 63, 63 (2006) (criticizing Supreme Court jurisprudence on the issue of wheth-
er and what state arbitration procedures and standards conflict with the FAA as “murky at 
best and bizarre at worst”); Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to 
Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV.
1097, 1143 n.180 (2006) (“[T]he larger academic literature on the Supreme Court’s current 
arbitration jurisprudence . . . express similar interest and confusion about whether the 
Supreme Court's arbitration jurisprudence will ultimately produce a relatively equitable  
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comprehensively its contortions by reference to the Court’s haphaz-
ard deployment of “intent.”13 Instead, commentators seeking to make 
sense of this phenomenon have drawn battle lines between the con-
sumer and the corporation,14 or between the employee and the em-
ployer,15 or even between state and federal courts.16 Yet, these vari-
ous fault lines do not tell the whole story. 
 To bridge this gap, this Article analyzes two primary sections of 
the Supreme Court’s FAA case law that exemplify starkly the warp-
ing effects of intent on it. The first concerns the fundamental alloca-
tion of jurisdiction between courts and arbitrators at the heart of the 
FAA, namely, the “gateway” question of which decisionmaker—court 
or arbitrator—should determine whether the underlying dispute is 
subject to arbitration.17 The second is a more recent, but already con-
                                                                                                                  
dispute resolution culture or will instead effectively close off meaningful review for many 
employees and consumers.”). 
 13. Cf. Richard C. Reuben, First Options, Consent to Arbitration, and the Demise of 
Separability: Restoring Access to Justice for Contracts with Arbitration Provisions, 56 SMU 
L. Rev. 819, 855 (2003) (noting that the Court’s approach to arbitrability in First Options
and Howsam “has potentially serious implications for the doctrine of separability, for it 
brings to the surface a fissure deeply embedded in the Supreme Court’s case law over the 
nature of assent required to establish an agreement to arbitrate”); Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Bootstrapping and Slouching Toward Gomorrah: Arbitral Infatuation and the Decline of 
Consent, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1381, 1384 n.8 (1996) (criticizing the “unrealistic, formal and 
narrow view of contract consent and meaning demonstrated in recent [arbitration] cases”); 
Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual Waiv-
ers of Constitutional Rights, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 167-68 (Winter/Spring 2004) 
(defending use of contract-law standards of assent). 
 14. See, e.g., Anne Brafford, Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts of Adhesion: 
Fair Play or Trap for The Weak And Unwary?, 21 J. CORP. L. 331 (1996); Mark E. Budnitz, 
Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and Financial Institutions: A Serious Threat to 
Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 267 (1995); Jeremy Senderowicz, 
Consumer Arbitration and Freedom of Contract: A Proposal to Facilitate Consumers’ In-
formed Consent to Arbitration Clauses in Form Contracts, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS.
275, 276 (1999); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme 
Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 682 (1996); Stephen J. 
Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (With a Contractualist Reply to 
Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195, 199 (1998). 
 15. See, e.g., Alexander J.S. Colvin, From Supreme Court to Shopfloor: Mandatory 
Arbitration and the Reconfiguration of Workplace Dispute Resolution, 13 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 581, 583-88 (2004); Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in 
the Debate over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 559 (2001); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Em-
ployee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV.
33, 38; Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s 
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. L. REV. 637 (1996). 
 16. See, e.g., Hiro N. Aragaki, Equal Opportunity For Arbitration, 58 UCLA L. REV.
1189 (2011); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and 
the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420 (2008); Linda R. Hirsh-
man, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REV.
1305 (1985); David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: 
The Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (2004). 
 17. See infra Part II.A. 
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troversial, issue that has far-reaching implications for all manner of 
consumer and employment contracts, specifically, the question con-
cerning the availability of class arbitration.18
 In undertaking this analysis, this Article does not—and does not 
mean to—determine directly the nature of “intent” and its normative 
value in contract law in general. That study is outside the scope of 
this Article. Rather, and regardless of its function in contract law 
more broadly, this Article aims to demonstrate that the Court’s reli-
ance on “intent” in the specific context of these two significant FAA 
questions reveals it as a troubled and fickle concept here, with unset-
tling consequences for the resulting jurisprudence.19 The Court shifts, 
for instance, between seeking out the parties’ actual, conscious intent 
to arbitrate and what I term their “constructive intent” to arbitrate, 
whereby the Court sets out to construct the purely hypothetical 
agreement that the parties would have chosen had they directed 
their minds to it at the time of contracting. Compounding the prob-
lem, the Court also vacillates between emphasizing the parties’ in-
tent to be procedurally bound by arbitration and their intent as to the 
substantive terms of their arbitration agreement. 
 The end result is an unstable FAA jurisprudence predicated on an 
abstract concept of “intent” that has little basis in reality but none-
theless impacts in very fundamental ways a broad range of contracts, 
including countless consumer and employment agreements. Further, 
much of the concept’s distorting influence is masked by the Court’s 
undifferentiated reference to “intent” as if it were monolithic. But a 
full account of the Court’s tangled FAA jurisprudence requires a de-
liberate and comprehensive parsing of “intent,” a concept that—for 
all of, or perhaps because of, its multi-faceted nature—leaves much to  
be desired. 
 Part I of this Article describes in summary the Court’s contract-
law—centered approach to the FAA. Part II goes on to examine the 
role of intent in FAA jurisprudence, and studies in detail its dis-
torting effects. Against this background, Part III maps out the con-
tours of that distortion; analyzes the singular focus of the Court on 
intent in the interpretation of arbitration agreements, even when the 
agreements are silent on the relevant issue; and weighs the broader 
implications of such an approach, including its potential vulnerability 
to court manipulation and party gamesmanship. 
                                                                                                                  
 18. See infra Part II.B. 
 19. That is, any value one attaches to “intent” in general is unnecessary, even irrele-
vant, for the purpose of evaluating the consequences of relying on it in the specific context 
of FAA law. It is those arbitration-specific consequences that are the focus of this Article. 
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II. THE COURT’S CONTRACTUAL APPROACH TO THE FAA 
 The idea of consent is central to the United States Supreme 
Court’s conception of arbitration.20 More fundamentally, the Court 
sees arbitration as nothing more than a question of contract, which, 
in its view, revolves around a volitional agreement that both parties 
have consented to. So devoted is the Court to this precept that it has 
become the unifying mantra in its decisions on the FAA. And so the 
Court has intoned that arbitration “is a matter of consent, not coer-
cion, and parties are generally free to structure their arbitration 
agreements as they see fit.”21 Similarly, the Court has catechized us 
on the fact that “arbitration is strictly a matter of contract” between 
the parties; it is a way to resolve those disputes—but only those dis-
putes—that the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration.22 In the 
Court’s view, the “passage of the Act was motivated, first and fore-
most, by a congressional desire to enforce agreements into which  
parties have entered,”23 and the primary purpose of the FAA is thus 
to “give effect to the contractual . . . expectations of the parties.”24
And—in case you missed the sermon—in this process, as with any 
other contract, the parties’ intentions control.25
 This approach may lend itself to the situation when the parties 
have clearly signaled pre-dispute their “intent,” whether by relevant 
words or conduct.26 Things get decidedly more vexing, however, when 
                                                                                                                  
 20. See Geneva Sec., Inc. v. Johnson, 138 F.3d 688, 691 (7th Cir. 1998) (“The Supreme 
Court's Steelworkers Trilogy makes clear a ‘first principle’ of federal arbitration law: 
‘[A]rbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitra-
tion any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.’ ”) (quoting United Steelworkers v. 
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)); Stephen J. Ware, Consumer 
Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (With a Contractualist Reply to Carrington & 
Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195, 195 (1998) (“The United States Supreme Court has 
largely adopted the contractual approach to arbitration law.”). 
 21. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,  
479 (1989). 
 22. Id. at 472. 
 23. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1984). 
 24. Volt Info. Scis., Inc., 489 U.S. at 479. 
 25. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947 (1995). 
 26. It bears observation that there are fierce critics in general of the Court’s contract 
law-centered—approach to the FAA. See, e.g., THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 157 (1997); Richard A. Bales & Sue Irion, How 
Congress Can Make a More Equitable Federal Arbitration Act, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1081 
(2009); Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT.
REV. 331; Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s 
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996); Advocates of this ap-
proach, however, base their support inter alia on the language of the FAA itself, specifical-
ly section 2 thereof, which provides that arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, 
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of 
any contract.” See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor’s 
Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001, 1004 n.13 (1996). As I argue 
in more detail below, however, accepting a contract-centered approach does not require the 
exclusive reliance on “intent” for the FAA questions examined here. See infra Part III.B. 
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the parties have failed to do so, including when the contract is omi-
nously “silent” on the relevant issue and, therefore, “intent.” Because 
parties will not anticipate every potential dispute, the more likely 
eventuality is that they will quarrel over an issue on which the con-
tract is silent. For example, even as fundamental a matter as arbi-
trability—that is, the question about whether the particular issue 
has been submitted to arbitration—may not have been expressly con-
templated for the particular issue but has to be resolved before the 
merits of the underlying dispute can be considered.27 A better exam-
ple is the more abstruse yet critical question of who should decide 
arbitrability.28 Here, the Court nonetheless employs the same con-
sent-based theory even though it is highly unlikely that the parties 
will have contemplated, much less agreed on, these questions, as the 
Court itself has acknowledged.29 Specifically, the Court does so by 
reference to what I call “constructive intent,” whereby the task for 
the Court is to construct the hypothetical agreement that the parties 
(or at least similarly-situated parties) would have chosen had they 
directed their minds to it at the time of contracting.30 As suggested by 
its name, constructive intent does not reflect any actual intent of the 
parties but is intent that courts will deem parties to possess. Such an 
approach, however, can yield very different answers for the same 
question, as reasonable (judicial) minds will differ as to what the par-
ties would have agreed to had they thought about the issue in dis-
pute. It is not necessarily helpful to be looking for the parties’ “objec-
tive” manifestations of intent when there may have been no intent to 
begin with. Put differently, this is not so much an analytical frame-
work as an exercise in conjecture. 
 Further, applying the contractual approach to federal arbitration 
law where the arbitration agreement is silent on the disputed issue 
arguably becomes more problematic as a doctrinal matter. The basis 
of the Court’s contractual approach to arbitration rests, in part, on 
section 2 of the FAA, which provides that “[a] written provision in . . . 
                                                                                                                  
 27. See Mark Berger, Arbitration and Arbitrability: Toward an Expectation Model, 56 
BAYLOR L. REV. 753, 775 (2004) (“arbitrability questions . . . precede the resolution of the 
merits of the dispute between the parties”); Andrew T. Guzman, Arbitrator Liability: Rec-
onciling Arbitration and Mandatory Rules, 49 DUKE L.J. 1279, 1309 (2000) (“[T]he question 
of arbitrability is a preliminary one . . . .”). 
 28. See First Options, 514 U.S. at 943. 
 29. Id. at 945 (“[T]he ‘who (primarily) should decide arbitrability’ question-is rather 
arcane. A party often might not focus upon that question or upon the significance of having 
arbitrators decide the scope of their own powers.”). 
 30. Cf. Alan Scott Rau, Everything You Really Need to Know About “Separability” in 
Seventeen Simple Propositions, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 34 (2003) (describing in similar 
terms the default rules at play in the doctrine of separability, which rules “ ‘most closely 
mimic the hypothetical bargain that the parties themselves would have chosen in a com-
pletely spelled-out agreement’—or perhaps, the bargain that most similarly situated par-
ties would have chosen—or at least, the bargain that it would be rational for such parties 
to have chosen ex ante”). 
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a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by 
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract . . . 
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds 
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”31
 Section 2 and other provisions of the FAA were “designed ‘to over-
rule the judiciary’s long-standing refusal to enforce agreements to 
arbitrate,’ and to place such agreements ‘upon the same footing as 
other contracts.’ ”32 The legislative history noted that courts histori-
cally were so acutely hostile that “they refused to enforce specific
agreements to arbitrate upon the ground that the courts were there-
by ousted from their jurisdiction.”33 As such, the focus of the FAA was 
to ensure that where parties had plainly entered into agreements to 
arbitrate, such agreements would be enforced.34 Accordingly, when 
the arbitral dispute turns not on the enforcement of an extant arbi-
tration agreement, but rather an issue on which the contract is si-
lent, say whether the court or the arbitrator should determine the 
arbitrability of the dispute, it is not clear that the FAA compels 
courts to adopt a contractual approach in resolving the dispute. 
There is then even less justification for relying on as nebulous a con-
cept as “intent” under the circumstances.  
 The next Part examines various instances where the Court has 
relied, inter alia, on the device of intent, whether actual or construc-
tive, in interpreting arbitration agreements that were silent on the 
disputed issue, and how such reliance has led to inconsistency, if not 
incoherency, in result.  
III. THE ROLE OF INTENT IN FAA JURISPRUDENCE
 Two broad questions and their treatment within the FAA frame-
work illustrate vividly the distorting effect of intent on the relevant 
case law. The first is the core FAA issue on the allocation of jurisdic-
                                                                                                                  
 31. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006); see Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After 
Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001, 1004 (1996) (noting 
that section 2 is “[t]he primary substantive provision of the FAA” and that its goal of over-
ruling the judiciary’s long-standing refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate represents 
“the core of the contractual approach to arbitration”); see also Stephen J. Ware, Consumer 
Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (With a Contractualist Reply to Carrington & 
Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195, 195 (1998) (noting that the Court’s contractual ap-
proach to arbitration “rests on the premise that arbitration law is a part of contract law so 
courts must enforce agreements to arbitrate unless contract law provides a ground for  
denying enforcement”). 
 32. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 
478 (1989) (citations omitted). 
 33. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 n.6 (1985) (emphasis added) 
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924)). 
 34. See id. at 220 (noting that when Congress passed the Arbitration Act in 1925, it 
was “motivated, first and foremost, by a congressional desire” to change this anti-
arbitration rule, and intended courts to “enforce [arbitration] agreements into which par-
ties had entered”). 
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tion between the court and the arbitrator, namely the question of 
which decisionmaker—court or arbitrator—should determine wheth-
er the underlying dispute is subject to arbitration.35 The second is the 
question of the availability of class arbitration, an issue that has sig-
nificant implications for myriad consumer and employment contracts. 
Intent in Who-Decides-Arbitrability Questions A.
 Arbitration, like litigation, is a binding method of dispute resolu-
tion.36 Under the FAA, then, a court “upon being satisfied that the 
issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration 
under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties 
stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in ac-
cordance with the terms of the agreement.”37 The determination as 
such of whether there is an applicable arbitration agreement deter-
mines whether the relevant dispute is resolved by arbitration or liti-
gation. There is, however, a preliminary question preceding such a 
determination, namely the question of who—court or arbitrator—gets 
to make this determination. This is an important preliminary inquiry 
as determining who gets first cut at the issue can change irrevocably 
the rules of interplay between the case and the two fora. For exam-
ple, if the arbitrator gets to decide arbitrability and determines that 
the dispute is subject to arbitration, the resulting arbitral award can 
be vacated by a court only under the most limited of circumstances 
enumerated under the FAA.38 Accordingly, the who-decides-arbitrability 
question matters a great deal to (counsel representing) parties who 
have a preference for one forum over the other. More broadly, what 
this means is that any question about the application of an arbitral 
clause potentially involves a significant meta-question not implicated 
in other kinds of disputes, namely the question of who—court or arbi-
trator—determines whether the arbitration clause applies.39
 As might be expected, this added layer of complexity in arbitral 
disputes, involving uniquely both an underlying arbitrability and a 
who-decides-arbitrability question, has only contributed to the com-
plicated nature of FAA jurisprudence. In choosing, as it does, to apply 
                                                                                                                  
 35. On the Court’s approach to arbitrability, see generally Jarrod Wong, Court or 
Arbitrator—Who Decides Whether Res Judicata Bars Subsequent Arbitration Under the 
Federal Arbitration Act?, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 49, 79-81 (2005). 
 36. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (providing that arbitration agreements “shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable”). 
 37. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2006); Prod. & Maint. Emps.’ Local 504 v. Roadmaster Corp., 916 
F.2d 1161, 1163 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (“Arbitration clauses are agreements to move 
cases out of court . . . .”). 
38. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006) (providing the FAA’s exclusive grounds for vacating  
arbitral awards). 
 39. See Alliance Bernstein Inv. Research & Mgmt., Inc. v. Schaffran, 445 F.3d 121, 
122 (2d Cir. 2006) (describing the “issue of who will decide the arbitrability question” as 
“preliminary” to the issue of “whether the claims must be arbitrated”). 
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the slippery concept of intent to both the underlying dispute and the 
meta-dispute, the Court has only exacerbated the problem. Indeed, in 
the course of two landmark decisions on the question of who—court 
or arbitrator—should decide the arbitrability of a dispute, the Court 
relied on different species of intent, veering from considering evidence 
of actual intent to applying constructive intent, leaving ever more un-
certainty in its wake. The two decisions in question are First Options of 
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan40 and Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.41
1.   First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan
 In First Options, the question before the Court was whether the 
district court or the arbitrator should decide if the respondents were 
bound to arbitrate a dispute under an arbitration agreement that the 
respondents had not personally signed.42 In ruling that the district 
court should decide the issue, the Court first distinguished between: 
(1) the arbitrability of the dispute (i.e., whether the parties have 
submitted a particular dispute to arbitration); and (2) the separate 
issue of who, court or arbitrator, determines the arbitrability of that 
dispute.43 The Court found that just as the arbitrability of a dispute 
depends on whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute, the 
determination of who “decide[s] arbitrability turns upon what the 
parties agreed about that matter.”44 If the parties had agreed to arbi-
trate arbitrability, then the arbitrator should get to decide whether 
the dispute is arbitrable. On the other hand, if the parties had not 
agreed to submit the arbitrability questions to arbitration, then the 
court should decide the question independently, just as it would any 
question not submitted to arbitration.45 The Court derived these con-
clusions “from the fact that arbitration is simply a matter of contract 
between the parties; it is a way to resolve those disputes—but only 
those disputes—that the parties have agreed to submit to arbitra-
tion.”46 That is, as interpreted by the Court, both the arbitrability 
and the who-decides-arbitrability questions turn on the intent of the 
parties and are subject to that same analysis.47
                                                                                                                  
 40. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995). 
 41. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002). 
 42. First Options, 514 U.S. at 942. 
43. Id.
 44. Id. at 943 (internal quotations marks omitted). 
 45. Id.
 46. Id.
 47. The Court’s articulation of these two questions is an instance of the Court’s all-
encompassing contract-centered approach under the FAA. See Stephen L. Hayford, Unifi-
cation of the Law of Labor Arbitration and Commercial Arbitration: An Idea Whose Time 
Has Come, 52 BAYLOR L. REV. 781, 856 (2000) (“[L]ike other matters pertaining to the ef-
fectuation of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate, it is clear the Court believes the key role 
of the courts is to ascertain the precise nature of the parties’ bargain and, having done so,  
enforce it.”). 
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 To determine the who-decides-arbitrability question, the First Op-
tions Court applied state law principles governing the formation of 
contracts.48 Those state law principles required the Court to decide 
“whether the parties objectively revealed an intent to submit the ar-
bitrability issue to arbitration.”49 Not surprisingly, the parties’ 
agreement did not expressly address the question of whether the 
court or arbitrator should determine if the underlying dispute was 
subject to arbitration.50 As the Court itself noted, the question of who 
should determine arbitrability is a higher-level question that is so 
“arcane” that, in general, parties are unlikely to have considered it 
when drawing up the arbitration agreement.51 Having acknowledged, 
in essence, that the parties had no conscious intent to speak of, the 
Court nonetheless persisted in relying on the touchstone of intent to 
resolve the issue.52 Specifically, the Court recast the inquiry as how 
one would, in divining intent, “interpret silence or ambiguity on the 
‘who should decide arbitrability’ point.”53
 Building on the fact that parties in general will not have consid-
ered, much less provided for, the issue, the Court held that “[c]ourts 
should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability 
unless there is ‘clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]’ evidence that they did 
so.”54 In other words, the presumption is that courts, not arbitrators, 
should determine arbitrability, since the reality is that parties will 
likely not have any intent bearing on the who-decides-arbitrability 
question. The parties cannot be said to have agreed to arbitrators 
deciding this question, contract being the only means by which  
arbitrators are authorized to act.55 Thus, what the Court effectively 
winds up doing here is applying an evidentiary test of actual, con-
scious intent: There being no clear evidence of actual intent on the 
part of the parties to entrust arbitrators to decide arbitrability, 
courts get to do so.56
 As we will see in the discussion of Howsam below, however, the 
Court ends up backpedaling some on this conclusion. Applying the 
test as articulated in First Options would lead to the court rather 
                                                                                                                  
 48. See First Options, 514 U.S. at 944. 
 49. Id.
 50. See id. at 947. 
 51. See id. at 945. 
 52. Id. at 947. 
 53. Id. at 945. 
 54. Id. at 944 (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643,  
649 (1986)). 
 55. See id. at 945. 
 56. Note that this is not an exercise in constructive intent since the Court does not 
consider—as it does in Howsam, see infra Part II.A.ii,—those factors, e.g., comparative 
expertise of arbitrators, that would lead one to conclude what the parties would have 
agreed upon had they considered the issue. Instead, the Court relies simply on the (likely) 
lack of actual intent as establishing a lack of agreement. See First Options, 514 U.S. at 945. 
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than the arbitrator determining arbitrability in many cases. This re-
sult follows logically from relying on actual intent (or the lack there-
of) and the fact that many arbitration agreements, or at least many 
of those agreements entered into prior to First Options, will be silent 
on the who-decides-arbitrability issue.57 Such an outcome, however, 
does not sit comfortably with what the Court has itself described as 
“the law’s permissive policies in respect to arbitration,” and it reme-
died that oversight soon enough in Howsam.58
 One aside before we turn to Howsam, and it’s an important one 
that demonstrates further how muddled the reliance on intent is. The
First Options Court also noted that the presumption applicable to the 
who-decides-arbitrability question is exactly opposite to the presump-
tion applied when one is confronted with silence on the underlying 
arbitrability question regarding the scope of the arbitral clause, i.e., 
“whether a particular merits-related dispute is arbitrable because it 
is within the scope of a valid arbitration agreement.”59 The presump-
tion in the latter situation is that “ ‘[a]ny doubts concerning the scope 
of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.’ ”60 The 
Court justified this presumption by noting that in a dispute about the 
scope of the clause, there is no question that the parties have agreed 
to the arbitration of some issues,61 and that “[i]n such circumstances, 
the parties likely gave at least some thought to the scope of arbitra-
tion.”62 Thus, in light of the FAA’s policy favoring arbitration, the 
Court reasoned that one should presume the parties agreed to arbi-
trate the particular matter absent evidence to the contrary.63 Yet, 
just because the parties agreed to arbitrate certain other matters 
does not mean they had considered, never mind agreed to arbitrate, 
the particular matters at issue. It is equally possible that they simply 
did not think about, and therefore had no relevant intent bearing up-
on, the particular matter. If so, would it not be more consistent, in 
line with the Court’s holding on the “who” issue, to acknowledge the 
same and say that we cannot find any agreement to arbitrate the 
particular matter?64 Conversely, if those FAA policies favoring arbi-
tration would lead us to find an agreement to arbitrate the particular 
                                                                                                                  
 57. The flip side of the story here is that going forward, and in response to the deci-
sion in First Options, the savvy party may well include a provision that specifies who de-
termines arbitrability. This, however, opens up the possibility for manipulation by the 
more strategic party, as was possibly the case in Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. 
Ct. 2772 (2010). See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 58. First Options, 514 U.S. at 945. 
 59. Id. at 944-45. 
 60. Id. at 945 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 
24-25 (1983)). 
 61. See id.
 62. Id.
 63. Id.
 64. See supra text accompanying notes 41-45. 
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issue notwithstanding the lack of any evidence one way or the other 
on intent, the same policies argue for allowing the arbitrator to de-
termine arbitrability when there is a corresponding lack of evidence 
of intent relating to the “who” question.65 But on to Howsam, which 
significantly qualifies, if not reverses in part, the Court’s decision in  
First Options.66
2. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
 In Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., the Supreme Court re-
vised in part its opinion in First Options by adopting a test that 
turned on constructive rather than actual intent.67 Howsam con-
cerned a lawsuit brought by a securities broker in federal court to 
enjoin its customer from arbitrating a dispute before the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) on the ground that the cus-
tomer was time-barred under an arbitration rule of NASD for initiat-
ing its request for arbitration more than six years after the dispute.68
The district court dismissed the action, holding that the question of 
whether the arbitration was time-barred was one for the arbitrator.69
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.70 Relying on 
its (entirely defensible) reading of First Options,71 the court of ap-
peals determined that the issue was one for the district court because 
“application of the NASD rule presented a question of the underlying 
dispute’s ‘arbitrability’; and the presumption is that a court, not an 
arbitrator, will ordinarily decide an ‘arbitrability’ question.”72
 The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the court of appeals 
(and therefore with itself in First Options), concluding, instead, that 
“the applicability of the NASD time limit rule is a matter presump-
tively for the arbitrator, not for the judge.”73 The Court explained 
that not every inquiry into whether a dispute is subject to arbitration 
is a so-called “question of arbitrability” that fell under the rule ar-
                                                                                                                  
 65. See supra text accompanying notes 43-48. 
 66. In an early article published in the Santa Clara Law Review in 2005, I had stated 
instead that Howsam “refined” or “clarified” the reasoning in First Options, which suggests 
that the decisions were compatible in a way that I do not now believe to be true. See Jarrod 
Wong, Court or Arbitrator—Who Decides Whether Res Judicata Bars Subsequent 
Arbitration Under the Federal Arbitration Act?, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 49, 79, 82 (2005). I 
chalk it up to the folly of youth and a naïve faith in the Court’s wisdom; wistfully, I have 
since been disabused of both. 
 67. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002). 
 68. Id. at 81. The NASD rule in question provided “that no dispute ‘shall be eligible 
for submission to arbitration . . . where six (6) years have elapsed from the occurrence  
or event giving rise to the . . . dispute.’ ” Id. (quoting NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION 
PROCEDURE § 10304 (1984)). 
 69. Id. at 82. 
 70. Id.
 71. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995). 
 72. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 82 (citation omitted). 
 73. Id. at 85. 
178 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:165 
ticulated in First Options.74 Rather, and for the first time, the Court 
distinguished between “substantive arbitrability,” which is such a 
“question of arbitrability” for courts rather than arbitrators, and 
“procedural arbitrability,” which is not.75
 Having quite suddenly arrived upon this bifurcation, the Court, of 
course, needs to explain it. But it barely does so, and then only with 
the corresponding lack of clarity that comes with building a doctrine 
around intent. Specifically, the Court described substantive arbitra-
bility questions as those questions that are 
applicable in the kind of narrow circumstance where contracting 
parties would likely have expected a court to have decided the 
gateway matter, where they are not likely to have thought that 
they had agreed that an arbitrator would do so, and, consequently, 
where reference of the gateway dispute to the court avoids the risk 
of forcing parties to arbitrate a matter that they may well not have 
agreed to arbitrate.76
But this inquiry begs the question: In the Court’s circular formu-
lation, those arbitrability matters to be decided by a court are those 
matters parties expect would be decided by a court (and even when 
parties may have no such expectation whatsoever).77 Seeming to 
acknowledge this, the Court valiantly goes on to provide examples. 
According to the Court, instances of substantive arbitrability ques-
tions include disputes “about whether the parties are bound by a giv-
en arbitration clause”—such as the one in First Options.78 These in-
stances also include disagreements over “whether an arbitration 
clause in a concededly binding contract applies to a particular type of 
                                                                                                                  
 74. Id. at 84-85. 
 75. Id. (quoting UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT §6(c) & cmt. 2 (revised 2000), 7 U.L.A. 12-13 
(Supp. 2002) (“RUAA”) in support of the distinction). Although the Court quotes and relies 
on the RUAA, which refers respectively to “substantive arbitrability” and “procedural arbi-
trability” in distinguishing between arbitrability matters to be decided by the court and the 
arbitrator, the Court does not itself consistently employ those terms. Instead, the Court 
refers to the former but not the latter as true “questions of arbitrability.” Id. at 84. Because 
the RUAA terminology is less confusing, this Article adopts that terminology, including 
when it describes the Court’s rulings. 
 76. Id. at 83-84. 
 77. See David S. Schwartz, Understanding Remedy-Stripping Arbitration Clauses: 
Validity, Arbitrability, and Preclusion Principles, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 49, 76 (2003) (describ-
ing definition of gateway questions as “obscure”); cf. Richard C. Reuben, First Options,
Consent to Arbitration, and the Demise of Separability: Restoring Access to Justice for Con-
tracts with Arbitration Provisions, 56 SMU L. REV. 819, 865 (2003) (“One may reasonably 
question whether the Court’s new nomenclature will engender more confusion than clarifi-
cation . . . . But it settles the law to know both that the procedural arbitrability doctrine is 
still viable, and, perhaps more important, how it is to be treated analytically in the post-
First Options regime.”). 
 78. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84. The Court cited, as examples, the disputes in First Op-
tions of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995) and John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston,
376 U.S. 543, 546-47 (1964), which held that “a court should decide whether an arbitration 
agreement survived a corporate merger and bound the resulting corporation.” Id.
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controversy,” such as whether a labor-management—layoff contro-
versy falls within the arbitration clause of a collective-bargaining 
agreement, and disputes over whether a clause providing for arbitra-
tion of various “grievances” covers claims for damages for breach of a  
no-strike agreement.79
 In contrast, matters of procedural arbitrability arise in “other 
kinds of general circumstance[s] where parties would likely expect 
that an arbitrator would decide the gateway matter” and are presump-
tively for the arbitrator to decide.80 Examples of such issues include 
procedural defenses to arbitrability, including waiver or delay.81
 Applying this dichotomous analysis, the Howsam Court deter-
mined that the applicability of the NASD time limit rule more closely 
resembled an issue of procedural arbitrability and was, therefore, a 
matter for the arbitrator and not the court.82 It found support for this 
conclusion in the fact that “the NASD arbitrators, comparatively 
more expert about the meaning of their own rule, are comparatively 
better able to interpret and to apply it.”83 In the absence of any 
statement to the contrary in the arbitration agreement, the Court 
found it “reasonable” to infer that the parties intended the agreement 
to reflect that understanding.84
 As an indication, however, of how precarious this exercise in in-
tent is, notice that one of the principal examples the Howsam Court 
provided of a substantive question of arbitrability—i.e., disagree-
ments over whether an arbitration clause in a concededly binding 
contract applies to a particular type of controversy—involves precise-
ly the same kind of scope-related dispute designated by the First Op-
tions Court as one where we would presume that the particular type 
of controversy would be arbitrable.85 If so, it would also be reasonable 
to assume that the parties would expect an arbitrator to make that 
call, since after all, arbitrators being “comparatively more expert 
about the [substance of the dispute], are comparatively better able to 
interpret and to apply it.”86 But this would then disqualify it as a 
                                                                                                                  
 79. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84. (citing AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 
475 U.S. 643 (1986) (holding that a court determines “whether a labor-management layoff 
controversy falls within the arbitration clause of a collective-bargaining agreement”) and 
Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238, 241-43 (1962) (“holding that a court should 
decide whether a clause providing for arbitration of various ‘grievances’ covers claims for 
damages for breach of a no-strike agreement”)). 
 80. Id. at 84. 
 81. See id. See also Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 
24-25 (1983) (finding a contract dispute between the parties to be arbitrable even with the 
addition of claims of waiver and delay). 
 82. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85-86. 
 83. Id. at 85. 
 84. Id.
 85. See supra text accompanying notes 51-56. 
 86. Id.
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substantive question of arbitrability. The point here, again, is that 
reasonable minds can and will disagree about what a party might 
expect, and intent remains a flimsy and malleable basis on which to 
apply the FAA. 
 Further, while it is likely the case that the parties in Howsam
simply did not consider the who-decides-arbitrability question and 
thus had no relevant actual, conscious intent, the absence of actual 
intent is no longer the interpretive focus of the Court in Howsam as 
it was in First Options. Instead, the approach employed in Howsam 
looks to constructive, rather than actual, intent. Specifically, the 
Howsam Court saw its task as determining what “reasonable” people 
in the parties’ shoes would have concluded on that matter had they 
directed their minds to it; since “reasonable” parties in the Howsam
situation would have wanted to rely on the NASD arbitrators’ com-
paratively greater expertise, the arbitrator gets to decide arbitrabil-
ity.87 In doing so, not only has the Court essentially adopted a test for 
a different kind of intent—i.e., constructive, rather than actual—it is 
invariably a less reliable test since the exercise is, by definition, hy-
pothetical in nature. It is in fact this nebulous free-form exercise in 
constructive intent that accounts for a fair amount of the incoherence 
we see in the FAA jurisprudence examined in this Article, including 
recent and controversial case law involving class arbitration. 
  Intent in Class Arbitration B.
 The availability of class arbitration has been a hot-button issue 
since at least the Court’s 2003 decision of Green Tree Financial Corp. 
v. Bazzle.88 Cast in histrionic terms as the last holdout for the belea-
guered consumer (or plaintiff class counsel, take your pick),89 what 
began in Bazzle as a question on whether an arbitration clause silent 
on the availability of class arbitration permitted class authorization,
has escalated into a pitched battle in AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concep-
cion on whether a consumer who has expressly waived class arbitra-
tion may avoid that agreement on grounds that it is unconscionable 
under state law.90 The troubled journey illustrates why a singular 
reliance on the amorphous concept of intent is a bad idea, and quite 
unnecessary to boot.  
                                                                                                                  
 87. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85. 
 88. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (plurality opinion). See infra
Part II.B.i. 
 89. Cf. Mandatory Arbitration Clauses: Undermining the Rights of  
Consumers, Employees, and Small Businesses, PUB. CITIZEN,
http://www.citizen.org/congress/article_redirect.cfm?ID=7332 (last visited Feb. 14, 2012) 
(“Class actions are the only effective remedy for wide-scale scams that rip off individual 
consumers . . . in small amounts.”). 
 90. AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). See infra Part II.B.iii. 
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1. Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle
 Bazzle concerned contracts containing arbitration clauses between 
a commercial lender (Green Tree) and its customers, including the 
Bazzles.91 When a dispute arose between the parties, the Bazzles 
sought to bring a class action in state court in South Carolina, and 
Green Tree responded with a request to stay the court proceedings 
and compel arbitration.92 While the contracts between Green Tree 
and its customers contained an arbitration clause, it did not express-
ly mention class arbitration, so we are once again “faced at the outset 
with a problem concerning the contracts’ silence.”93 Notwithstanding, 
the trial court both certified a class action and entered an order com-
pelling arbitration, and the arbitrator subsequently appointed in the 
arbitration administered the proceeding as a class arbitration.94 The 
arbitrator eventually issued an award in favor of the class, which was 
appealed ultimately to the South Carolina Supreme Court.95
 The South Carolina Supreme Court ended up affirming the 
award.96 After discussing both California precedent upholding a 
court’s authority to order class-wide arbitration under section 4 of the 
FAA97 and conflicting Seventh Circuit precedent holding that a court 
had no such authority,98 the South Carolina court elected to follow 
the California approach, which it characterized as permitting a trial 
court to “order class-wide arbitration under adhesive but enforceable 
franchise contracts.”99 Under this approach, the South Carolina court 
observed, a trial judge must “[balance] the potential inequities and 
inefficiencies” of requiring each aggrieved party to proceed on an in-
dividual basis against the “resulting prejudice to the drafting party” 
and should take into account factors such as “efficiency” and “equi-
ty.”100 Applying these standards to the case before it, and in light of 
its finding that the arbitration clause in the Green Tree contracts 
was “silent regarding class-wide arbitration,”101 the South Carolina 
court ruled as follows: 
[W]e . . . hold that class-wide arbitration may be ordered when the 
arbitration agreement is silent if it would serve efficiency and equity, 
                                                                                                                  
91. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 447 (plurality opinion). 
 92. Id. at 449. 
 93. Id. at 447. 
 94. Id. at 449. 
 95. Id. at 449-50. 
 96. Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349, 363 (S.C. 2002), vacated, 539 U.S.  
444 (2003). 
 97. See id. at 356-57 (discussing Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982)). 
 98. See id. at 356 (discussing inter alia Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269  
(7th Cir. 1995)). 
 99. Id. at 357, 360. 
 100. Id. at 357 & n.15. 
 101. Id. at 359 (emphasis omitted). 
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and would not result in prejudice. If we enforced a mandatory, ad-
hesive arbitration clause, but prohibited class actions in arbitra-
tion where the agreement is silent, the drafting party could effec-
tively prevent class actions against it without having to say it was 
doing so in the agreement.102
 Although unremarkable in other circumstances, it is striking in 
this context that the South Carolina court is looking to factors beyond
intent in construing contracts—as is permitted under every variant 
of Contract Law save, apparently, that of the U.S. Supreme Court in 
relation to arbitration—taking into account such things as efficiency 
and public policy. As this approach readily instructs, the interpreta-
tion of contracts need not, and does not, turn exclusively on intent. 
Any such lesson was lost on the U.S. Supreme Court, however, when 
Bazzle made its way there after the Court granted certiorari to de-
termine whether the South Carolina court’s holding was consistent 
with the Federal Arbitration Act.103
 A virtual microcosm of FAA case law, the resulting Bazzle opinion 
was so fractured that no single rationale commanded a majority, thanks 
in part to its confusion over intent.104 In short, the plurality, which disa-
greed with the dissenters about whether the who-decides-arbitrability 
question was a substantive question of arbitrability, only got its way 
because Justice Stevens reluctantly concurred with its result;105 alt-
hough, a detailed survey reveals various and ever more nuanced con-
flicts within the Court revolving around intent. 
 Writing for the prevailing plurality, Justice Breyer held that the 
relevant question was whether the South Carolina Supreme Court’s 
interpretation was erroneous because, as both the petitioner and the 
joint dissent asserted, the contracts were not silent but instead 
should reasonably be read to forbid class arbitration.106 However, this 
question itself was preceded by another, namely who, court or arbi-
trator, should decide whether the contracts were silent or else prohib-
ited class arbitration.107 Because the plurality saw the underlying 
arbitrability question here as asking “what kind of arbitration pro-
ceeding the parties agreed to,” which in turn was regarded as “con-
cern[ing] contract interpretation and arbitration procedures,” this 
                                                                                                                  
 102. Id. at 360 (footnote omitted). 
 103. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (plurality opinion). 
 104. Id. at 446. 
 105. Id. at 454-55 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 106. Id. at 450. The relevant arbitration clause provided “that disputes  ‘shall be re-
solved . . . by one arbitrator selected by us [Green Tree] with consent of you [Green Tree’s 
customer].’ ” Id. (citation omitted). As the plurality pointed out, the dissent believed that 
class arbitration was “inconsistent with this requirement,” since “class arbitration involves 
an arbitration, not simply between Green Tree and a named customer, but also between 
Green Tree and other (represented) customers, all taking place before the arbitrator chosen 
to arbitrate the initial, named customer’s dispute.” Id. at 450-51 (emphasis added). 
 107. Id. at 451. 
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was a procedural rather than a substantive question of arbitrabil-
ity.108 Accordingly, the arbitrator rather than the court should decide 
the question per Howsam, and since the South Carolina trial court 
here had ordered class certification rather than defer to the arbitra-
tor, the Court vacated the South Carolina Supreme Court’s decision 
and remanded the case.109
 Now, while determining who decides arbitrability is not the only 
way the plurality might have approached the issue—see the South 
Carolina’s Supreme Court’s decision or, alternatively, the joint dis-
sent’s approach—such a framework is almost assured when one ele-
vates the role of intent as the Court has. This then renders the re-
sulting analysis vulnerable to the nebulous nature of intent. To wit, 
the joint dissent here disagreed with the plurality’s categorization of 
the underlying arbitrability question as a procedural issue to be de-
termined by the arbitrator.110 Instead of viewing the class arbitration 
question as one relating to merely the type of proceedings the parties 
had agreed to, the dissent would characterize the issue as one concern-
ing the parties’ agreement about the way arbitrators are selected.111
Phrased thusly, the underlying arbitrability question more closely re-
sembles, as the dissent argued, a substantive question of arbitrability 
for the courts.112 What this again demonstrates is the pliability of the 
concept of (constructive) intent and its resulting uncertainty. 
 According to the dissent, then, the court rather than the arbitrator 
should determine whether the arbitration clause allows for class ar-
bitration.113 But the dissent doesn’t stop there. Even though the in-
terpretation of contracts is a matter of state law that a federal court 
would not review,114 it found the South Carolina court’s interpreta-
tion to be evidently contrary to the terms of the arbitration clause, 
which plainly forbade class arbitration, per the dissent.115 As such, 
the dissent would have held that the South Carolina court’s interpre-
tation was thereby preempted by the FAA, whose “ ‘central purpose’ 
. . . is ‘to ensure that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced 
according to their terms.’ ”116 Yet, such a conclusion is awkward, to 
say the least. The meaning of any such “terms” requiring enforce-
ment must be determined by reference to the law governing the con-
tract, here South Carolina law. It is thus not possible, by definition, 
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for the South Carolina court’s interpretation of the clause to be con-
trary to its terms—they are one and the same thing.117 What the dis-
sent has done, in effect, is to substitute and ordain its own interpre-
tation as the authoritative interpretation, and then declare the South 
Carolina court’s interpretation as contrary to it. To see this more 
clearly, one need only ask exactly what law the dissent was applying 
to arrive at its interpretation of the arbitration clause as prohibiting 
class arbitration. Since the FAA has no body of law (that I know of) 
relating generally to the interpretation of “terms,” and it was not ap-
plying South Carolina law, the dissent must simply have been inter-
preting the terms and determining the parties’ intent according to its 
own, personal brand of the law. Which is to say that we’ve now re-
placed the parties’ intent with the dissent’s intent. And so we see, yet 
again, how slippery an exercise steeped in (non-existent or, at least, 
unexpressed) intent can be. 
 And finally, there’s Justice Stevens’ separate opinion, which 
while—and only just barely—concurring with the result reached by 
the plurality, injected a third strain of uncertainty into the mix. Alt-
hough he did not endorse the plurality’s rationale, Justice Stevens 
concurred in the judgment vacating and remanding because there 
would otherwise have been “no controlling judgment of the Court.”118
He did not take a definitive stance on the who-decides-arbitrability 
question, stating only that “[a]rguably the interpretation of the par-
ties’ agreement should have been made in the first instance by the 
arbitrator.”119 But because he did not believe that the petitioner had 
raised the question of the appropriate decision maker, he preferred 
not to reach that question and instead, would have affirmed the deci-
sion of the South Carolina Supreme Court on the ground that “the 
decision to conduct a class-action arbitration was correct as a matter 
of law.”120 As Justice Stevens did not elaborate on the issue, one can 
only speculate as to whether he thought that the South Carolina Su-
preme Court’s decision was correct as a matter of deference to state 
law or, more tantalizingly, because he believed one should look be-
yond intent to considerations of efficiency and public policy in con-
struing contracts. What remains problematic, however, is the doctri-
nal inconsistency between Justice Stevens’ preferred approach and 
that of the plurality. As discussed earlier, the who-decides-
arbitrability question approach adopted by the plurality not only 
gives prominence to the role of intent, but also changes irremediably 
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the rules of the game and thus the complexion of the case.121 Specifi-
cally, if—as the plurality decides here—the arbitrator should deter-
mine arbitrability,122 any resulting award issued by the arbitrator 
can only be vacated by a court under limited grounds enumerated 
under section 10 of the FAA.123 Significantly, these grounds do not
include an award that is erroneous under the law.124 As the Court 
itself has recently noted, these grounds “restate the longstanding 
rule that, ‘[i]f [an arbitration] award is within the submission, and 
contains the honest decision of the arbitrators, after a full and fair 
hearing of the parties, a court . . . will not set [the award] aside for 
error, either in law or fact.’ ”125
 Thus, adopting the who-decides-arbitrability approach here would 
not be consistent with Justice Stevens’ preferred approach of resolv-
ing the dispute on the basis of the correctness of the South Carolina’s  
court decision. 
 Scarcely surviving its various crosscurrents of reasoning, the plu-
rality opinion in Bazzle is all but displaced in the recent decision of 
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., where the 
Court again confronts the question of whether an arbitration clause 
that is silent on class arbitration may be read nonetheless to allow for 
it.126 Except that now in Stolt-Nielsen, the Court changes course, and 
the majority takes it upon itself to interpret the arbitration clause, 
thereby endorsing the approach adopted by the dissent in Bazzle.127
                                                                                                                  
 121. See supra text accompanying notes 29-31. 
 122. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 454. 
 123. See section 10(a) of the FAA which provides that the court may vacate the award:  
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) 
where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of 
them; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to post-
pone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence 
pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which 
the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators ex-
ceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and 
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.  
9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006). The Court has expressly declared “that the statutory grounds are 
exclusive,” and “that the FAA confines its expedited judicial review to the grounds listed in 9 
U.S.C. §§ 10 and 11,” Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 578, 592 (2008). 
 124. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006); see also Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953) 
(“[T]he interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are 
not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation.”). 
 125. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1780 (2010) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1854)); see also 
Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37 (noting that the “[p]ower to vacate an [arbitration] award is 
limited,” and that “the interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to mani-
fest disregard [of the law] are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error  
in interpretation”). 
 126. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1764. 
 127. Id. at 1770. 
186 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:165 
2.   Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.
 The issue in Stolt-Nielsen was whether the arbitrators had proper-
ly interpreted the arbitration agreement between commercial parties 
as allowing for class arbitration when the agreement was silent on 
the subject.128 In a startling decision with Justice Alito writing for the 
majority, the Court not only vacated the award after finding that the 
arbitrators had exceeded their powers—which the Court was author-
ized to do—but also went on to interpret affirmatively the clause 
even though it was indubitably a question for the arbitrators. 129 Jus-
tice Alito defended the decision’s reach on the ground that the major-
ity, having “conclude[d] that there can be only one possible outcome 
on the facts,” saw “no need to direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.”130
Ironically, as the discussion below details, this decision was purport-
edly premised on and justified by reference to the parties’ intent.  
 Stolt-Nielsen involved a dispute between petitioner shipping com-
panies and certain of its corporate customers, including AnimalFeeds 
International Corp., who had contracted for the shipment of their 
goods pursuant to a charter party (standard shipping contract in 
maritime trade), which is typically selected by the customers, as was 
the case with AnimalFeeds.131 AnimalFeeds’ charter party provided 
in relevant part: 
Arbitration. Any dispute arising from the making, performance or 
termination of this Charter Party shall be settled in New York, 
Owner and Charterer each appointing an arbitrator, who shall be 
a merchant, broker or individual experienced in the shipping busi-
ness; the two thus chosen, if they cannot agree, shall nominate a 
third arbitrator who shall be an Admiralty lawyer. Such arbitra-
tion shall be conducted in conformity with the provisions and pro-
cedure of the United States Arbitration Act [i.e., the FAA], and a 
judgment of the Court shall be entered upon any award made by  
said arbitrator.132
 AnimalFeeds, along with other charterers, sued Stolt-Nielsen in 
federal court alleging illegal price fixing, and the parties were re-
quired, as a result of various court decisions, to arbitrate their anti-
trust dispute pursuant to the arbitration clauses in their charter par-
ties.133 AnimalFeeds then served petitioners with a demand for class 
arbitration seeking to represent similarly placed customers of peti-
tioners’ services.134 The parties—and this is significant—entered into 
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a supplemental agreement to arbitrate the threshold issue of wheth-
er the charter party permitted class arbitration under the American 
Arbitration Association’s Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration 
(AAA Class Rules).135 The parties also stipulated that the arbitration 
clause was “silent” with respect to class arbitration.136 After hearing 
evidence and argument, including testimony from Stolt-Nielsen’s ex-
perts regarding arbitration customs and usage in the maritime trade, 
the panel determined that the arbitration clause allowed for class 
arbitration.137 The panel found persuasive the fact that various arbi-
tration decisions after Bazzle had construed a wide variety of clauses 
as allowing for class arbitration, and also that the expert testimony 
offered did not demonstrate an “inten[t] to preclude class arbitra-
tion.”138 Under these circumstances, the panel concluded that Bazzle,
together with general policy considerations, dictated its decision that 
the clause permitted class arbitration.139
 Stolt-Nielsen sought successfully to vacate the arbitration award 
in federal district court in New York, which found that the arbitra-
tion panel’s decision was made in “manifest disregard” of the law.140
Specifically, the district court considered the panel’s reliance on 
Bazzle to be misplaced since Bazzle merely determined that the issue 
of class arbitrability was for the arbitration panel to decide, and did 
not in fact speak to the issue of whether the clause permitted class 
arbitration.141 The district court also found that if the panel had un-
dertaken a “meaningful” choice-of-law analysis, it would have con-
cluded that maritime and New York state law would have applied to 
preclude class arbitration.142 On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed 
after concluding that the relevant maritime and state laws were in-
conclusive on the issue, and that the arbitration panel could not thus 
have been in manifest disregard of the law.143
 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.144 Writ-
ing for the majority, Justice Alito charged the arbitration panel with 
the cardinal sin of failing to determine the parties’ intent in inter-
preting the arbitration clause, as was required under either of the 
two laws that potentially governed the contract (New York law and 
maritime law).145 Had the panel done so, it would not have inferred 
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from the silence on class arbitration an intent so to arbitrate given 
the radically distinct nature of class arbitration from bilateral arbi-
tration.146 For example, the chosen arbitrator would now resolve “dis-
putes between hundreds or perhaps even thousands of parties” ra-
ther than “a single dispute between the parties to a single agree-
ment,” and any resulting award would likewise “adjudicate[] the 
rights of absent parties,” as opposed to “bind[ing] just the parties to a 
single arbitration agreement.”147 Additionally, under the AAA Class 
Rules, “ ‘the presumption of privacy and confidentiality’ that applies 
in many bilateral arbitrations ‘shall not apply in class arbitra-
tions.’ ”148 Indeed, Justice Alito went so far as to describe the panel’s 
conclusion as “fundamentally at war with the foundational FAA prin-
ciple that arbitration is a matter of consent.”149    
 Instead of determining the parties’ intent, the majority found that 
the arbitration panel had “simply imposed its own conception of 
sound policy” in looking predominantly to what the panel perceived 
as “a post-Bazzle consensus . . . that class arbitration is beneficial in 
‘a wide variety of settings.’ ”150 In the process, the panel declined to be  
persuaded by 
court cases denying consolidation of arbitrations, by undisputed 
evidence that the [particular type of] charter party had never been 
the basis of a class action, or by expert opinion that sophisticated, 
multinational commercial parties of the type that are sought to be 
included in the class would never intend that the arbitration 
clauses would permit a class arbitration.151
Accordingly, as “the task of an arbitrator is to interpret and enforce a 
contract, not to make public policy,” the panel’s award “may be  
vacated under § 10(a)(4) of the FAA on the ground that the [panel] 
‘exceeded [its] powers.’ ”152
 But the majority did not stop there. In addition to vacating the 
award, it took the highly unusual step of affirmatively interpreting 
the arbitration clause to prohibit class arbitration, even though the 
question was plainly one for the arbitrators.153 It did so purportedly 
under section 10(b) of the FAA and on the ground that there was “on-
ly one possible outcome on the facts,” thereby dispensing with the 
need to refer the question back to the panel.154
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 As the dissent points out, however, section 10(b) allows for no such 
thing.155 As an initial matter, section 10(a) authorizes a court to va-
cate an arbitral award made in the district on enumerated grounds 
specified in the section.156 Section 10(b) goes on to provide in its en-
tirety that “[i]f an award is vacated and the time within which the 
agreement required the award to be made has not expired, the court 
may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.”157 Thus, 
section 10(a) allows the Court to vacate the award under particular 
circumstances, and section 10(b) further authorizes the Court in that 
event to refer the question back to the arbitrators if the deadline for 
the issuance of the award has not expired, but that is all. Section 
10(b) most certainly does not authorize the court to substitute the 
arbitrator’s decision with its own. 
 In interpreting the arbitration clause, the majority has thus hi-
jacked the role of the arbitrators. Yet, as the dissent notes, there was 
no question that the parties’ supplemental agreement “undoubtedly 
empowered the arbitrators to render their clause-construction deci-
sion.”158 Even taken on its own terms, the majority’s “characterization 
of the arbitration panel’s decision as resting on ‘policy,’ not law, is 
hardly fair comment, for ‘policy’ is not so much as mentioned in the 
arbitrators’ award.”159 Indeed, the dissent observed that the panel 
had explicitly indicated it had looked to the language of the parties’ 
agreement to determine if they “intended to permit or to preclude 
class action[s].”160 Focusing on the wording of the clause, the panel 
emphasized its breadth and noted that similarly comprehensive lan-
guage had been interpreted to permit class proceedings.161 It is thus 
plain that the arbitrators had “ ‘constru[ed] . . . the contract’ with fi-
delity to their commission” and since the Court may vacate the award 
if the panel exceeded its powers but not if it were erroneous, it “may 
not disturb the arbitrators’ judgment, even if convinced that ‘serious 
error’ infected the panel’s award.”162 Worse, the Court not only set 
aside the arbitral decision, it compounded that error by arrogating to 
itself the power to interpret the arbitration clause, and thereby “sub-
stitute[d] its judgment for that of the decisionmakers chosen by the 
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parties.”163 The irony here is that the Court’s appropriation of the ar-
bitrators’ role was justified on the basis of the “parties’ intent.” 
 As discussed in more detail below, however, the Court does not 
have to rely exclusively on the parties’ intent in determining whether 
class arbitration is available.164 Indeed, the result in AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion, which was the next occasion on which the Court 
pronounced on this issue, suggests as much.165
3.   AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion
 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, a lightning rod of a case re-
cently decided by the Court, is representative of a recent wave of cas-
es brought by plaintiffs seeking to rely on the unconscionability doc-
trine to set aside, or at least limit, arbitration agreements in adhe-
sion contacts.166 The point of entry for these plaintiffs in resisting ar-
bitration is the so-called “saving clause” in section 2 of the FAA, 
which provides that arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevoca-
ble, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in eq-
uity for the revocation of any contract.”167 By attacking the arbitra-
tion agreement as unconscionable under relevant state law and, ac-
cordingly on “grounds . . . for the revocation of any contract,” plain-
tiffs seek to have courts set aside the offending arbitral clause within 
the framework of the FAA itself.168   
 In Concepcion, the contracts at issue were individual arbitration 
agreements between a cellphone company and its customers in Cali-
fornia that expressly prohibited the customers from bringing class 
proceedings, including class arbitration.169 Resisting arbitration, 
plaintiffs argued before the federal district court that the arbitration 
agreements were unconscionable under California law for enabling 
parties with superior bargaining power to perpetrate a scheme delib-
erately to cheat countless consumers out of individually small sums 
of money, thereby serving to exempt those parties from their own 
fraud.170 In a prior decision, Discover Bank v. Superior Court, the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court had specifically identified such a class-action 
waiver as unconscionable, and thus unenforceable, under California 
law.171 Taking its cue from Discover Bank, the district court decided 
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in favor of plaintiffs and struck the class-proceeding waiver, and the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.172 A sharply divided U.S. 
Supreme Court reversed, however, in a decision that, like Bazzle,
comprised a plurality, a stand-alone concurrence, and a dissent.173
 Concepcion is a significant and controversial decision for various 
reasons, and over which much ink will no doubt be spilt.174 For the 
narrower purposes of this Article, however, it should initially be not-
ed that because Concepcion involves an arbitration agreement ex-
pressly prohibiting class arbitration, it does not present the difficul-
ties of ascertaining intent in the void of the parties’ silence that are 
the primary concern of this Article. Nonetheless, Concepcion may be 
instructive insofar as it suggests that the Court may look outside “in-
tent” to determine the validity of an arbitration agreement. In this 
regard, what bears observation in Concepcion is that the Court up-
held the arbitration agreement with the class-action waiver with lit-
tle reference to the parties’ intent, even though that intent—to ex-
clude class arbitration—could not have been plainer. Instead, the 
Court found for the petitioner on the ground that the Discover Bank
rule was preempted for conflicting with the FAA’s objective of  
facilitating efficient arbitration of claims.175 Specifically, the Court 
found that the Discover Bank rule increased the complexity of arbi-
tral procedures, thereby discouraging and effectively discriminating  
against arbitration.176
 It is evident, if not ironic, that the Concepcion Court could not re-
fer to the parties’ explicit and manifest “intent” to exclude class arbi-
tration since the whole premise of the plaintiffs’ argument is that any 
arbitration agreement based on such “intent” is necessarily defective 
because of the unconscionability of the class-action waiver.177 As an-
other indication of how untethered “intent” is to reality, it is worth 
observing that in all probability, the typical consumer here is as un-
likely to comprehend the fact that she has waived the right to pursue 
class proceedings, as the fact that she has entered into an agreement 
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to arbitrate any dispute arising under the contract.178 Yet, she will be 
deemed to have validly consented to the latter, but not necessarily 
the former.179 In any event, the Court must and does look outside the 
parameters of “intent” in deciding whether the arbitration agreement 
is enforceable. Specifically, the Court upheld the arbitration agree-
ment by looking to the public policies enshrined in the FAA and de-
termined that allowing the application of California law relating to 
unconscionability here would frustrate those policies, and that con-
versely, enforcing the agreement would be compatible with them.180
 Writing for the plurality, Justice Scalia first identified the “over-
arching purpose of the FAA” as that of “ensur[ing] the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate 
streamlined proceedings.”181 The opinion went on to consider whether 
California’s effective prohibition of class arbitration waivers under 
the Discover Bank rule was consistent with this purpose by directly 
examining what is entailed in class arbitration as opposed to bilat-
eral arbitration.182 In the process, the Court observed that class arbi-
tration is comparatively “slower, more costly, and more likely to gen-
erate procedural morass than final judgment.”183 Additionally, class 
arbitration proceedings have to account for the due process rights of 
absent third parties, which the Court questioned whether Congress 
meant for arbitrators to manage.184 Similarly, the Court doubted that 
Congress could have contemplated class arbitration with the higher 
stakes involved when it passed the FAA since arbitral awards are 
generally not appealable and can be set aside on judicial review only 
on the most limited of grounds.185 Accordingly, the Court held that 
the FAA preempted California’s Discover Bank rule since “it ‘stands 
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as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full pur-
poses and objectives of Congress.’ ”186
 Again, for the limited purposes of this Article, what the decision 
suggests—regardless of whether one agrees with the particular com-
parisons drawn by Scalia—is that courts do not have to rely exclu-
sively on the vexing concept of “intent” in deciding whether to enforce 
an arbitration agreement. For instance, in arriving at its decision, 
the Court identified and relied upon the fact that one of the goals of 
the FAA is the efficient and expeditious resolution of disputes 
through arbitration.187 While the Court had looked to that goal in the 
context of determining if otherwise applicable state law is pre-
empted, it would appear reasonable also to rely on such a general 
statutory policy for the purpose of interpreting the arbitration 
agreement, including determining if an arbitration agreement that is 
silent on class arbitration should be read to allow for it. Accordingly, 
courts need not simply look to “intent,” but should also consult other 
FAA policies in interpreting arbitration agreements, particularly 
when those agreements are silent on the disputed issue. 
IV. TO ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES 
 Having examined some of the ways in which the concept of intent 
has warped FAA case law, this Article now considers the contours 
and content of that distortion, the inexplicable tunnel vision associ-
ated with intent, and the broader implications, including its potential 
vulnerability to manipulation. 
Intent to be Bound vs. Intent as to Terms A.
 Much of the tension revolving around intent in the Court’s FAA 
jurisprudence can be traced to one fundamental yet poorly recognized 
schism in this area: The intent of the parties to be bound versus the 
intent of the parties as to the terms of the contract.    
 In his groundbreaking monograph, The Common Law Tradition: 
Deciding Appeals, Karl Llewellyn tackled the problem of intent in 
standard contracts by bifurcating the concept between the specific 
intent to be bound by negotiated terms (what are called “dickered” 
terms) and a blanket assent to all “reasonable” nondickered terms.188
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This bifurcation can be reconceptualized and applied in the context of 
arbitration as a distinction between (1) the parties’ intent as directed 
to the terms of the contract, and (2) the parties’ intent to be bound  
by arbitration.189 The former concerns the parties’ agreement to the 
particular terms in the contract including the arbitral clause, that is, 
its content or substance. The latter, however, speaks to the parties’ 
agreement to be bound, in general, by the arbitral process, including 
the agreement to respect as binding any award legitimately issued by  
the arbitrator. 
 While the Court has used “intent” as a seemingly monolithic term, 
these two senses of intent can and have led to conflicting results. For 
example, the Stolt-Nielsen majority focused on whether the arbitral 
clause could be read as an agreement by the parties to class arbitra-
tion and then ultimately interpreted it as excluding such a definition 
based on its own reading of the clause.190 That the majority was con-
cerned with the meaning of the arbitral terms as agreed to by the 
parties is apparent from its affirmative displacement of the arbitra-
tors’ interpretation based on what it saw as “only one possible out-
come on the facts.”191 In choosing to “see the question as being wheth-
er the parties agreed to authorize class arbitration,” the majority was 
looking to the parties’ intent as to terms.192 In contrast, the dissent in 
Stolt-Nielsen emphasized that the “parties’ supplemental agreement, 
referring the class-arbitration issue to an arbitration panel, undoubt-
edly empowered the arbitrators to render their clause-construction 
decision.” 193 That is, the bargain that was struck between the parties 
was for the arbitrators’ decision to be binding, even if infected with 
factual or legal error, so long as they did not exceed their powers. 
Thus, the dissent was looking to the parties’ intent to be bound.
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 Conversely, the Bazzle plurality regarded the underlying arbitra-
bility question here as asking “what kind of arbitration proceeding 
the parties agreed to,” which “concerns contract interpretation and 
arbitration procedures.”194 As such, it conceived of the dispute in pro-
cedural terms, and in finding that the parties had agreed to refer the 
arbitrability question to arbitrators, looked to the parties’ intent to be 
bound.195 The Bazzle dissent, however, saw the dispute differently, 
preferring simply to reverse the South Carolina Supreme Court’s in-
terpretation on the ground that its interpretation was erroneous in 
that it contravenes the terms of the arbitration agreement about the 
selection of an arbitrator.196 Thus, in focusing as the dissent does on 
the substantive import of the arbitral clause, it was looking was look-
ing to the parties’ intent as to the terms.
 In short, because the Court’s discussion of intent conflates the two 
distinct varieties of intent, which can and do lead to conflicting out-
comes, it exacerbates the incoherence resulting from reliance on an 
already confused concept.  
Whither the Singular Focus on Intent? B.
 The Court has not only treated intent as a monolithic construct, it 
has treated it as practically the only construct for interpreting and 
enforcing arbitration agreements under the FAA. But there is no rea-
son for this limitation, particularly with regard to those cases involv-
ing arbitration agreements that are silent on the disputed issue.197
This is true even assuming we proceed under the contractual ap-
proach to federal arbitration law endorsed by the Court, which has 
made it abundantly clear that it views the FAA as “reflect[ing] the 
fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.”198
 Contract law, however, does not rely solely on the concept of in-
tent for the purposes of enforcing contracts. For instance, a classic 
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contract law treatise notes that “public policy” is relied upon in “guid-
ing courts in their decisions whether or not to enforce contracts,” and 
goes on to devote the next thirty-seven pages to exploring that ques-
tion.199 Examples would include the strict construction of covenants 
restricting trade and the use of land, and the unenforceability of ille-
gal contracts or other contracts violating public policy as expressed in 
statutes.200 Indeed, recall the discussion above of Bazzle, which in-
volved a decision by the South Carolina Supreme Court holding that 
the arbitration agreement may be interpreted as allowing for class 
arbitration, even if it was silent on the subject, provided it served the 
interests of “efficiency” and would not result in prejudice.201 Similarly, 
as also discussed above, Concepcion suggests that FAA policies, includ-
ing that of promoting efficient and expeditious dispute resolution, 
may be consulted when interpreting an arbitration agreement.202
 As such, to the extent contract law incorporates other values and 
looks to considerations such as public policy and efficiency in constru-
ing contracts, the same should be employed in interpreting arbitra-
tion agreements so long as they do not discriminate against arbitra-
tion and do not conflict with FAA policies.203 However, not only has 
the Court generally avoided reference to criteria other than intent in 
interpreting arbitration agreements, it has, on occasion, been posi-
tively hostile to arbitrators relying on anything other than intent to 
construe the arbitration agreement. In Stolt-Nielsen, the Court de-
cried the arbitrators for relying on public policy to interpret the arbi-
tration clause and, in fact, vacated the arbitral award on that ba-
sis.204 The Court found the arbitrators to have exceeded their powers 
under section 10(a)(4) of the FAA since “what the arbitration panel 
did was simply to impose its own view of sound policy,” which was 
improper, “for the task of an arbitrator is to interpret and enforce a 
contract, not to make public policy.”205
 Yet the Court has been quite happy to allow arbitrators to assume 
jurisdiction over statutory claims—including antitrust claims—, 
which are legal expressions of public interest.206 As the Court itself 
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made clear, the FAA “provides no basis for disfavoring agreements to 
arbitrate statutory claims by skewing the otherwise hospitable in-
quiry into arbitrability.”207 Indeed, in this regard, one commentator 
notes that the “ship sailed a long time ago” on “the exploded idea that 
arbitral competence does not extend to matters of ‘public policy.’ ”208
Correspondingly, once we agree that contract law allows for inquiry 
into values other than intent, including public interest considera-
tions, arbitrators are automatically authorized to rely on such values 
in construing contracts. 
Malleability and Susceptibility C.
 As noted earlier, the amorphous nature of intent, particularly 
when we are dealing with constructive intent, is a conjectural exer-
cise that all but invites the Court to substitute its view for the par-
ties’ intent.209 This arguably happened in Stolt-Nielsen, when the 
Court not only vacated the panel’s award but also proceeded affirma-
tively to interpret the arbitration clause.210   
 Perhaps more worryingly, this same malleability also potentially 
allows for strategic behavior by the parties, particularly in light of the 
inability of arbitrators to look to public policy considerations to con-
strue the arbitration agreement. This particular risk is adumbrated in 
the Court’s recent decision in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson.211
 In Rent-A-Center, the Court held, in a 5-4 decision, that an arbi-
trator rather than a federal district court should determine the arbi-
trability of an employment dispute where the parties had entered 
into an arbitration agreement that provided not only for arbitration 
arising out of the employment, but which also stated that 
the Arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local court or agency, 
shall have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to 
the interpretation, applicability, enforceability or formation of this 
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[Arbitration] Agreement including, but not limited to any claim 
that all or any part of this Agreement is void or voidable.212
That is, the employer, who had drafted the agreement, deliberately 
overrode the usual presumptions underlying the who-decides-
arbitrability question by specifically and comprehensively providing 
that the “who” here was the arbitrator for all arbitrability questions, 
including substantive questions of arbitrability. Accordingly, the par-
ties were deemed to have “intended” the delegation of all arbitrability 
questions to the arbitrator for resolution.213
 Except, of course, that the employee in all likelihood had no un-
derstanding of the implications of this delegation clause.214 Now, or-
dinarily, to the extent the situation raises unconscionability or simi-
lar concerns, this would be addressed under the saving clause of the 
FAA, which requires courts to enforce arbitration agreements “save 
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of 
any contract.”215 The operation of the saving clause would take the 
case away from the arbitrator and place it back in the hands of the 
court. That at least is what the employee in Rent-A-Center argued 
should occur, asserting as he did that the arbitration agreement was 
substantively unconscionable because it was one-sided in requiring 
arbitration of claims that the employee was likely to bring but not 
claims that the employer was likely to bring.216 The employee also 
alleged that the arbitration agreement’s fee-splitting provision and 
its limits on discovery were substantively unconscionable.217
 The district court ordered arbitration, but a divided panel of the 
Ninth Circuit reversed, without oral argument.218 Justice Scalia, 
writing for a majority of the Court, said that “[a]n agreement to arbi-
trate a gateway issue is simply an additional, antecedent agreement 
the party seeking arbitration asks the federal court to enforce, and 
the FAA operates on this additional arbitration agreement just as it 
does on any other.”219
 The question, then, in the case at bar was whether the delegation pro-
vision was valid under section 2. Under the Court’s precedent—employing 
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what is known as the separability doctrine—the arbitration clause is 
treated as severable from and independent of the contract that hous-
es or contains that arbitration clause.220 Accordingly, only a challenge 
to the validity of the arbitration clause itself, as opposed to a challenge 
to the entire container contract, will trigger the operation of the sav-
ing clause, and place the dispute back in the court’s hands. 
 Applying these principles to the case, Justice Scalia held that the 
employee’s unconscionability arguments did not target the delegation 
provision specifically, but rather applied generally to the entire 
agreement.221 Accordingly, the delegation provision, being severable, 
would survive such a general challenge, which means the saving 
clause is not activated and the dispute goes to the arbitrator for ad-
judication. What was unusual here, however, was that the container 
contract was an arbitration agreement in its entirety (i.e., the agree-
ment here did not involve the standard scenario of an employment 
contract containing an arbitration clause but rather an arbitration 
agreement containing a delegation clause).222 The dissent believed 
this distinctive feature meant that here, exceptionally, the saving 
clause would operate even if the challenge (as was the case here) did 
not target the delegation clause but rather went to the entire agree-
ment generally since the entire agreement was nothing more than an 
arbitration agreement.223
 The rather dramatic net result here is that the emphasis on “in-
tent” (played out in the form of the savvy delegation clause) has 
trumped the spirit if not the letter of the saving clause notwithstand-
ing the latter’s codification in the FAA. While it is true that this out-
come is also attributable to the unusual circumstance of an arbitra-
tion agreement constituting the entirety of the written agreement 
between the parties, that circumstance is something the sophisticat-
ed employer (or seller) can—and in this case, did—control. There 
would appear to be a significant incentive for an employer or seller 
not only to include such a delegation clause but also to separate the 
arbitration agreement from the underlying contract such that the 
arbitration agreement is a stand-alone document containing the del-
egation clause. Such a selective structuring would appear to clear a 
path to arbitration while side-stepping the separability doctrine.  
In short, then, the Court’s elevation of “intent” effectively creates  
the potential for manipulation of the arbitration agreement by the 
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(drafting) party with greater bargaining power to shunt the parties 
into arbitration by way of a unilaterally-imposed delegation clause, 
which the Court would nonetheless endorse as reflecting both parties’ 
explicit “intent” to refer all arbitrability questions to the arbitrator. 
V. CONCLUSION  
 The Court’s FAA jurisprudence, as it relates to the determination 
of arbitrability and class arbitration, suffers from an incoherence that 
can be traced to the pervasive role of “intent” in its contract-centered 
theory of arbitration law. “Intent” in this context, however, is at once 
elusive and polymorphic. It is elusive because the parties—even so-
phisticated ones, never mind the consumers and employees—will of-
ten not have considered the relevant arbitrability question and, thus, 
have no actual intent regarding the same. It is polymorphic as ren-
dered by the Court, which has careened from looking for evidence of 
actual, conscious intent to constructive intent, and from the intent 
to be bound procedurally by arbitration to the intent respecting the 
substantive terms of the arbitration agreement. It is these chamele-
on qualities of “intent” that create many of the tensions we see in 
FAA case law, but that are themselves camouflaged by the Court’s 
treatment of the concept as monolithic. As such, a complete and  
accurate account of the Court’s jurisprudence under the FAA re-
quires us also to scrutinize closely the role of “intent,” a concept that 
is ultimately wanting. 
